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The sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu Islands between China and
Japan is a sensitive issue touching upon various aspects of international
law. One of the major claims of both countries is whether the Islands
have been ceded to Japan, and if so, have they been reverted to China.
Since cession and reversion were completed through a series of treaties,
this paper explores the dispute by evaluating treaty law. The paper first
outlines three sovereignty claims over the Islands and then provides a
chronological review of the pertinent treaties. It then discusses the nonapplicability contention and the treaty interpretation contention, two
interpretations popular among mainland Chinese scholars. The article
concludes that treaty law cannot provide a satisfactory solution to the
dispute and suggests that both countries should resort to other
international laws of territorial acquisition and strive for more innovative
political solutions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Diaoyu Islands, also known as the Diaoyutai or Senkaku
Islands, are located in the East China Sea, approximately 120 nautical
miles east of Fuzhou, China and ninety nautical miles north of Japan’s
Ryukyu Islands. The islands are composed of five uninhabited islets and
three barren rocks, totaling a land area of less than seven square
kilometers.1
Since the early 1970s, the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands has
gradually developed into one of the most difficult and sensitive problems
between China and Japan and has also caused wide international
concerns. 2 For example, in early September 2010, a Chinese fishing
trawler collided with Japanese inspection vessels in the waters off the
Islands. The Japanese government detained the trawler and its captain,
prompting strong reactions in both countries and sparking widespread
nationalist emotions. 3 More recently, in early November 2010, U.S.
1

See Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Tiao-Yu-Tai (Senkaku) Islands and
the Law of Territorial Acquisition, 14 VA. J. INT’L L. 221, 221 (1973) (describing the
barren state of the Islands); Hungdah Chiu, An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute Over
the T’iaoyutai Islets (Senkaku Cunto), 15 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L & AFF. 9, 9–10
(1996) (describing the location, physical characteristics, and economic value of the Diaoyu
Islands).
2
See Dai Tan, The Diaoyu/Senkaku Dispute: Bridging the Cold Divide, 5 SANTA CLARA J.
INT’L L. 134, 135–41 (2006) (recounting the political and economic tension that spawns
for this dispute).
3
After the incident both countries reiterated their sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.
Japan argued that its detainment of the trawler and its captain was legal under Japanese
law. See Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Statement by the Press
Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on
the Collision Between Japan Coast Guard Patrol Vessels and a Chinese Fishing Trawler in
Japan's Territorial Waters off the Senkaku Islands (Sept. 25, 2010), available at
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Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the Diaoyu Islands are
subject to the jurisdiction of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between Japan and the United States (U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty), 4 further escalating the dispute and increasing tension in SinoAmerican relations.5
There are various economic, social, and political reasons that
explain why these “tiny islets” are of great importance to China and Japan.
First, economic considerations are the major cause of the dispute. These
“small isolated islets” did not always have this value, and it was not until
the early 1970s, when rich oil resources in the seabed were discovered,
that China and Japan claimed sovereignty over the Islands.6 Moreover, as
the Islands are situated at the edge of the continental shelf of the East
China Sea, they are important to the delineation of the boundary between
China and Japan. 7 This factor is particularly important because both
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2010/9/0925_01.html (“The Government of
Japan handled the most recent incident duly and strictly under its jurisdiction and in
accordance with domestic law as a case involving obstruction of the execution of official
duty by a Chinese fishing trawler.”). China rebutted that such detainment was in violation
of international law, asserting “China expresses strong dissatisfaction with and grave
protest against Japan's obstinate decision to put the Chinese captain under the so-called
judicial procedures, ignoring China's repeated solemn representations and firm
opposition.” Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Remarks on Japan Detaining Captain of the
Chinese Fishing Boat (Sept. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t751900.htm.
4
Clinton Tells Maehara Senkaku Subject to Japan-U.S. Security Pact, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Sept. 23, 2010.
5
See Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu’s Remarks (Nov. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t766758.htm (“[T]he Diaoyu Island[s] . . .
are China's inherent territory . . . . It is extremely erroneous . . . that the Diaoyu Island[s]
fall[] within . . . the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. What the U.S.
should do is to immediately correct its wrong position.”).
6
See Cheng, supra note 1, at 221–22 (describing the “oil rush” that commenced between
China and Japan after a petroleum deposit was discovered in the continental shelf running
through the Islands); Chiu, supra note 1, at 10–11 (explaining that the Islands were thought
to have little economic value before the discovery of oil); Selig S. Harrison, Seabed
Petroleum in Northeast Asia: Conflict or Cooperation?, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CENTER
FOR SCHOLARS 5-6 (2005) (estimating the value of petroleum in the reserve); Victor H. Li,
China and Off-Shore Oil: The Tiao-yu Tai Dispute, 10 STAN. J. INT’L STUD. 142, 155–56
(1975) (discussing China’s expanding claim of sovereignty in reaction to the discovery of
sea-bed oil near the Islands); Peter N. Upton, International Law and the Sino-Japanese
Controversy over Territorial Sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, 52 B.U. L. REV. 763, 764
(1972) (discussing Japan’s interest in the petroleum reserves as the world’s largest
importer of petroleum byproducts).
7
See Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, The International Law’s Unhelpful Role in The Senkaku
Islands, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 903, 912 (2008) (explaining the importance of the Islands in
boundary delimitation between China and Japan); Steven W. Su, The Tiaoyu Islands and
Their Possible Effect on the Maritime Boundary Delimitation Between China and Japan, 3
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 385, 385–91 (2004) (discussing the United Nations Convention on the
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Japan and China are parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS), which states that the Islands are a decisive
factor for claiming the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) privileges that
are necessary to obtain rights to the natural resources.8 Second, over the
years the Islands have become closely intertwined with the national
identity of the two countries and have incited nationalist sentiments. 9
Third, the dispute is unique because it affects Sino-American and crossStrait diplomacy, both sensitive issues. 10 Thus, the dispute also
profoundly affects the regional peace and security in East Asia.11
In light of the above reasons, it is necessary to address the dispute.
Admittedly, the dispute touches upon various aspects of international law,
especially the law of territory acquisition, 12 law of the sea,13 and treaty law,
Law of the Sea’s lack of specific delimitation of maritime boundaries between China and
Japan in the East China Sea); Thomas R. Ragland, Note, A Harbinger: The Senkaku
Islands, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 664, 664–67 (1973) (locating of the islands and the state
sovereignty dispute over them). See generally Jin-Hyun Paik, The U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea and Boundary Delimitation Issues in East Asia, 24 KOREAN J. COMP. L. 125,
125 (1996) (describing the boundary dispute between China and Japan).
8
Pursuant to Articles 55, 56, and 57 of the UNCLOS, a state may establish its EEZ
“beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea” which may be extended to up to “200 nautical
miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured,” and is
entitled to various rights including the right to the natural resources within the EEZ.
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea arts. 55, 56, 58, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. Though some argue that the Islands are “rocks” and
only territorial sea that can not generate EEZ, it is undisputed that the Islands can bring
rich resources to the sovereign state can establish title. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON &
MARK. J. VALENCIA, PACIFIC OCEAN BOUNDARY PROBLEMS: STATUS AND SOLUTIONS 113
(Shigeru Oda ed., 1991) (outlining five options to delineate the boundary between China
and Japan); MARK J. VALENCIA ET AL., SHARING THE RESOURCES OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
41–45 (Shigeru Oda ed., 1997) (discussing whether the Spartly Islets have the capacity to
generate EEZs under Article 121 of UNCLOS); Jon M. Van Dyke, North-East Asian Seas–
Conflicts, Accomplishments and the Role of the United States, 17 INT’L J. MARINE &
COASTAL L. 397, 399–401 (2002) (stating that China asserts that the islands cannot be an
EEZ because they are just “rocks.”); Jon M. Van Dyke et al., The Exclusive Economic
Zone of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands: When Do Uninhabited Islands Generate an
EEZ?, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 425, 425 (1988); Jon M. Van Dyke & Robert A. Brooks,
Uninhabited Islands: Their Impact on the Ownership of the Oceans’ Resources, 12 OCEAN
DEV. & INT’L L. 265, 265 (1983).
9
See Seokwoo Lee, The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan and the Territorial
Disputes in East Asia, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 63, 91 (2002) (discussing nationalism as
a cause of flare-ups in the Dispute); Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 7, at 920 (claiming that
if either country yields on the Island dispute it will come across as “betraying the nation”).
10
The purpose of the paper is not to discuss the cross-Straits relations. The use of the
Republic of China (ROC) is for clarity of discussion and does not necessarily mean
recognition of the ROC as a sovereign state under international law.
11
See Mark J. Valencia, The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and
Possible Solutions, 31 ASIAN PERSP. 127, 130–31 (2007) (describing how competition for
gas resources is hampering Sino-Japanese relations, and how the dispute implicates this
competition).
12
See, e.g., Peter N. Upton, supra note 6, at 767–86; Cheng, supra note 1.
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yet, the dispute has not been sufficiently explored from a treaty law
perspective. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to explore the
dispute by analyzing pertinent treaties and discover if treaty law can
achieve a satisfactory solution.
Part II of this article summarizes three major claims over the
Diaoyu Islands under international law and explains why a treaty law
perspective is adopted. Part III then provides a brief review of various
treaties pertaining to the Islands in chronological order and discusses their
legal significance as they relate to the dispute. Part IV analyzes China’s
two major contentions in respect to the dispute: the non-applicability
contention and the treaty interpretation contention. Part VI concludes that
treaty law cannot provide a satisfactory solution to the dispute and submits
that both China and Japan should explore other rules of international law
on territorial acquisition and take innovative political efforts to solve the
dispute.

II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE THREE MAJOR LEGAL CLAIMS
Though the dispute may be approached from different legal
perspectives, the central issue of is one of sovereignty; therefore, it is most
effective to discuss the dispute by focusing on international laws of
territorial acquisition. It is generally agreed that customary international
law recognizes five major methods of territory acquisition: occupation,
prescription, cession, accretion, and conquest. 14 The first three methods
are relevant to the dispute. 15
Occupation refers to a situation where a state gains the sovereign
right over a territory which was previously terra nullius by exercising
effective occupation with an intent and will to act as the sovereign. 16
13

See, e.g., Ragland, supra note 7, at 665–69 (discussing sovereignty of the Senkaku
Islands in terms of control over the natural resources in the seabed of the surrounding
vicinity).
14
See SURYA P. SHARMA, TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION, DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
35–40 (1997) (explaining the framework of the current acquisition process of territory);
Seokwoo Lee, Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition in
International Law and a Modest Proposal, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–2 (2000) (describing
the methods of territorial acquisition).
15
See Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 7, at 913 (covering the customary international law
relevant to territorial acquisition).
16
See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933, P.I.C.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at
45 (Apr. 5) (discussing Denmark’s ability to exercise sovereignty over Greenland);
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 43 (Oct. 16) (describing how
occupation was effectuated in the context of western saharan countries); RamosMrosovsky, supra note 7, at 913–14 (“Occupation is the usual means for a state to gain
sovereignty over a territory that was previously terra nullius, that is, territory belonging to
no sovereign”).
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Japan claims that it discovered the Diaoyu Islands and incorporated them
into its territory as terra nullius in 1894. China argues Chinese fishermen
first discovered and used the Islands and that the Islands have been
incorporated into China’s territory since the Ming dynasty in the 15th
century.17
Prescription is when a state that fails to contest another state’s
assertion of sovereignty over its territory loses its sovereign right because
it failed to insist upon them. 18 Under international law, shift of
sovereignty cannot be recognized unless the prescribing state’s occupation
has been public, peaceful, and uninterrupted. 19 In this respect, Japan
argues that China acquiesced to its occupation of the Islands since China
did not raise any objection until the 1970s. However, China’s silence was
understandable due to the Cold War and its alliance with the U.S.20
Cession refers to a state’s voluntary grant of its sovereign rights in
a territory to another state.21 This often takes place within the framework
of a peace treaty following a war.22 Japan asserts that China ceded the
Islands to it in the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 after the Sino-Japanese
War. China, by contrast, argues that the Islands were reverted to China
after Japan was defeated in World War II through a series of international
declarations and treaties.23
Each of these three claims merits a lengthy discussion, but this
paper does not aim to provide a comprehensive study on all three claims.
Instead, it focuses on the third claim of whether the Islands were ceded to
Japan, and if so, whether they have been restored to China under
international law. Because the alleged cession and restoration at issue
results from a series of territorial disposition provisions in various treaties,
this article takes a treaty law perspective.

17

See Steven W. Su, The Territorial Dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: An Update, 36
OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 45, 48–49 (2005) (discussing China’s historical use of the Islands,
including use of the Islands as coastal defense in the 16th century); Comment, The East
China Sea: The Role of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes, 1973 DUKE L. J.
823, 848 (1973) (discussing Japan’s annexation of the Islands in the Sino-Japanese war of
1895).
18
SHARMA, supra note 14, at 118–19.
19
Upton, supra note 6, at 774.
20
Su, supra note 17, at 48–49 (explaining that the Islands were under the U.S.
administration and that there was little reason no occasion or urgency for the Chinese to
raise any question about them).
21
SHARMA, supra note 14, at 136–41.
22
MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 420 (5th ed., 2003).
23
See William B. Heflin, Diaoyou/Senkaku Islands Disputes: Japan and China, Oceans
Apart, 1 ASIAN PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 3–9 (2000) (discussing China’s historical claim to
entitlement of the Island following World War II with the Cairo Conference, San Francisco
Peace Treaty of 1951, and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952).
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III. A REVIEW OF TREATIES PERTAINING TO THE DIAOYU
ISLANDS
First, it is necessary to conduct a brief chronological review of the
treaties relevant to the dispute as well their legal significance.
A.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895)

After Japan defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War, China
ceded Formosa together with “all islands appertaining or belonging to the
said island of Formosa” to Japan under the terms of the Treaty of
Shimonoseki. 24 Although this treaty did not clearly mention the Diaoyu
Islands, it did note that “China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full
sovereignty the following territories, together with all fortifications,
arsenals, and public property thereon . . . . The island of Formosa, together
with all islands appertaining or belonging to said island of Formosa.” 25
Such wording may lead to the understanding that the Diaoyu Islands had
been ceded to Japan.
B.

The Wartime Declarations (the 1940s)

After the Allied Powers defeated Japan in World War II, the
United States, United Kingdom, and Republic of China, in pursuance of
the Cairo Communiqué (Cairo Declaration) issued on December 1, 1943,
requires that:
Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific
which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of
the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories
Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria,
Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the
Republic of China.26
This point was reiterated in the ensuing Proclamation Defining
Terms for Japanese Surrender (Potsdam Declaration) issued on July 26,
1945, “[t]he terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and
Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido,
Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.” 27 Shortly
after World War II, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established
24

Treaty of Shimonoseki, China-Japan, art. 2 (b), Apr. 17, 1895, reprinted in 1 TREATIES
1894–1919 18, 19 (John V. A.
MacMurray ed., 1929).
25
Id. art 2.
26
Cairo Declaration, Dec. 1, 1943, 3 U.S.T. 858.
27
Potsdam Declaration, para. 8, July 26, 1945, 3 U.S.T. 1204.
AND AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING CHINA
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on October 1, 1949. To build the legitimacy of the new regime, the PRC
deemed itself as the sole legal representative of China even though the UN
did not recognized it until October 25, 1971.28 The establishment of the
PRC complicated the dispute both politically and legally. On the one
hand, both the PRC and ROC shared sovereignty claim over the Diaoyu
Islands; on the other hand, the PRC refused to recognize the treaties
concluded or recognized by the ROC after 1949.29
C.

The San Francisco Treaty (1951)

On September 8, 1951, the Allied Powers and Japan signed the
Treaty of Peace with Japan (San Francisco Treaty). China (ROC and
PRC) was not a party to this agreement. This treaty clearly aims at
restoring China’s sovereignty and defining the post-war territory of Japan,
substantially codifying the principles expressed in the Wartime
Declarations. Since the San Francisco Treaty effects the final disposition
of the territories in East Asia after World War II, it should be regarded as
the starting point for discussion of the dispute. 30 Though the San
Francisco Treaty did not expressly require Japan to revert the Diaoyu
Islands to China, two of its provisions are closely connected with the
dispute: the restoration provision and trusteeship provision. The
restoration provision provides that Japan renounces all right, title, and
claim to Formosa and the Pescadores. 31 According to the “trusteeship
provision,” the Diaoyu Islands were put under U.S. trusteeship.32
The ROC and PRC differed in their reaction towards the San
Francisco Treaty. The ROC did not raise objection to the treaty because it
was preoccupied with the civil war with the PRC and it did not want to
cross the United States, its ally and partner in a mutual defense treaty. 33
Taking a contrary position, the PRC strongly objected to the treaty on
various occasions. On August 15, 1951, Premier Zhou Enlai criticized the
negotiation and conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty, declaring it was a
“most absurd” and “unilateral” act of United States. His rhetoric implied
that the PRC would not recognize the treaty, but rather based its claim to
28

Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2578 (XXVI) (Oct. 25, 1971). Before this date, the ROC was the legal
representative for China in the United Nations.
29
See K. T. Chao, East China Sea: Boundary Problems Relating to the Tiao-Yu-T’ai
Islands, 2 CHINESE TAIWAN Y.B. INT’ L L. & AFF. 45, 45 (1982).
30
Lee, supra note 9, at 70 (asserting the importance of the San Francisco Treaty).
31
Treaty of Peace with Japan, art. 2 (a), Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45
[hereinafter San Francisco Treaty].
32
Id., art. 3 (“Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nation
to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering
authority”).
33
Chiu, supra note 1, at 24–25.
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the Islands on the Declaration by United Nations, the Cairo Declaration,
the Yalta Agreement and the Potsdam Declaration, as well as the basic
policies adopted by the Far East Committee. 34 Shortly afterwards,
Premier Zhou clarified the PRC’s position in the Declaration on the Issue
of Peace Treaty with Japan on September 18, 1951. The Premier
expressly challenged the legality of the San Francisco Treaty and its
binding force on China, declaring that a peace treaty without participation
of the People’s Republic of China is neither complete nor genuine in its
entirety and that the Central People’s Government deems the treaty illegal,
invalid and thus absolutely unacceptable. 35
Indeed, had the San Francisco Treaty expressly addressed the
legal status of the Diaoyu Islands, the dispute would have been resolved.
Although “the careful drafting of the San Francisco Treaty could have put
an end to the territorial disputes over [the Diaoyu] islands,” the Allied
Powers intentionally chose to omit the issue of the Diaoyu Islands when
concluding the treaty. 36 In this respect, a careful examination of all
previous drafts of the San Francisco Treaty and a wide range of other
related agreements and documents supports the idea that the drafters failed
to account for the Diaoyu Islands.37
D.

The Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty (1952)

After the San Francisco Treaty, the Treaty of Peace Between the
Republic of China and Japan was concluded on August 5, 1952 (1952
Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty). This treaty heavily relies on the San
Francisco Treaty and clearly reaffirms Japan’s obligation to China under
the San Francisco Treaty. Two provisions of this Treaty are related to the
Diaoyu Islands, which can be roughly classified as the restoration
provision and the nullification provision. The former aims at restoring
China’s sovereignty over certain islands prescribed in the San Francisco
Treaty, while the later aims to nullify Sino-Japanese treaties governing the
issue of territorial disposition that were signed before 1941. The
restoration provision states:
It is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace
with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the
34

XIANDAI GUOJI GUANXISHI CANKAO ZILIAO (现代国际关系史参考资料) [MATERIALS
(1951–1953) 556 (Guoji Guanxi
Xueyuan (国际关系学院) [University of International Relations] ed., 1960).
35
Id. at 632.
36
Lee, supra note 9, at 144 (citing Memorandum of Conversation, Canberra Conference
on Japanese Peace Treaty, State Department Decimal File No.740.0011 PW (PEACE)/10647, State Department Records, Record Group 59 (Oct.6, 1947)).
37
Lee, supra note 9, at 144–45 (“Territorial provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty
largely reflected the Allied Powers’ policy in East Asia, which failed to give serious
consideration to the rival claims to title over specific territories.”).
ON THE HISTORY OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS]
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United States of America on September 8, 1951 [], Japan
has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan
(Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the
Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands. 38

The nullification provision recognizes that “all treaties,
conventions and agreements concluded before December 9, 1941 between
China and Japan have become null and void as a consequence of the
war.”39
In a sense, the conclusion of the 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty
provided a chance for the ROC to clarify the vagueness of the San
Francisco Treaty. Surprisingly, the 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty
touched upon neither the sovereignty nor the trusteeship over the Diaoyu
Islands; however, the silence of the ROC was understandable because the
ROC and the United States were allies at that time and it was unnecessary
for the ROC to resist U.S. trusteeship. 40 Besides, when the treaty was
concluded, it was impossible for the ROC to predict that the United States
would “revert” the Islands to Japan some twenty years later.41
Unsurprisingly, the PRC strongly opposed the 1952 Sino-Japanese
Peace Treaty. On May 5, 1952, Premier Zhou stated that the PRC firmly
objects to the peace treaty between the Chiang Kai-Shek regime and the
Yoshida government which openly humiliates and is hostile towards the
Chinese people.42 Despite its objection, the PRC did not raise any clear
sovereignty claim over the Diaoyu Islands. Considering that the newly
established PRC was isolated from the international community, it would
have been infeasible for China to claim sovereignty over the Islands
because such a claim could be deemed as a hostile act against the United
States and would place China in a precarious situation. 43
E.

The Okinawa Agreement (1971)

U.S. trusteeship over the Diaoyu Islands was terminated upon the
conclusion of the Agreement Between the United States of America and
Japan Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands on June 17,
1971 (Okinawa Agreement). Though the Okinawa Agreement explicitly
38

Treaty of Peace Between the Republic of China and Japan, China-Japan, art. II, Apr. 28,
1952 138 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty].
39
Id. art. IV.
40
Chiu, supra note 1, at 24–25.
41
See Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan Concerning the
Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, U.S.-Japan, June 17, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 447
[hereinafter Okinawa Agreement] (terminating U.S. trusteeship over the Diaoyu Islands
and “reverting” the Islands to Japan).
42
XIANDAI GUOJI GUANXISHI CANKAO ZILIAO, supra note 34, at 662.
43
See Cheng, supra note 1, at 242.
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required the United States to “relinquish in favor of Japan all rights and
interests under Article 3” of the San Francisco Treaty, it did not expressly
mention the Diaoyu Islands. 44 The pertinent part of this agreement reads:
With respect to the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands,
as defined in paragraph 2 below, the United States of
America relinquishes in favor of Japan all rights and
interests under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan
signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951,
effective as of the date of entry into force of this
Agreement.
Japan, as of such date, assumes full
responsibility and authority for the exercise of all and any
powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over
the territory and inhabitants of the said islands. 45
Against the opposition of both the ROC and PRC, the United States
“reverted” the Diaoyu Islands to Japan. On June 11, 1971, right before
the conclusion of the agreement, the ROC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
issued a formal statement commenting on the agreement and expressly
claimed sovereignty over the Islands:
With respect to the United States’ statement that it intends
to transfer the Diaoyu Tai Islands, together with the
Ryukyu Islands, to Japan, the government of the Republic
of China especially feels surprised and startled. . . . The
Islands are affiliated with the Province of Taiwan and
constitute a part of the territory of the Republic of
China.46
Likewise, right after the PRC resumed legal representation of China in the
UN, the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also raised objections to the
conclusion of the Okinawa Agreement, claiming sovereignty over the
Islands and denying the effect of the Agreement on China:
[The conclusion of the Okinawa Agreement is] an evident
violation of Chinese sovereignty and territories, and it
would not be tolerated by the Chinese people. The United
States and Japan included the Diaoyu Islands in the
regions of reversion, but that was illegal, and would never

44

Okinawa Agreement, supra note 41, at 449.
Id., art. I (1).
46
Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China on the Ryukyu
Islands and the Diao-Yu-Tai Islands, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(June 11, 1971),
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=40531&ctNode=2038&mp=1.
45
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change the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China
over the Diaoyu Islands.47

Pitifully, facing the objections of both the ROC and the PRC, the United
States took an ambiguous and straddling position that intentionally left the
dispute to China and Japan. The United States responded that the
Okinawa Agreement only dealt with the transfer of administrative rights,
not sovereignty, over the Diaoyu Islands. 48
F.
The Four Treaties Between the PRC and Japan (the
1970s onwards)
Though the PRC resumed the seat of China in the UN in 1971, it
still faced great pressure to obtain wider international recognition. To
normalize and promote bilateral relations with Japan, the PRC concluded
several important treaties with Japan after the 1970s, namely, the Joint
Declaration Between the People’s Republic of China and Japan
concluded on September 29, 1972 (1972 Sino-Japan Joint Declaration), 49
the Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the People’s Republic of
China and Japan concluded on August 12, 1978 (1978 Sino-Japanese
Peace Treaty),50 the Joint Declaration Between the People’s Republic of
China and Japan on Establishing Peaceful and Developing Friendly
Cooperative Partnership Relations concluded on November 26, 1998
(1998 Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration), 51 and the Joint Declaration on
Comprehensively Promoting Strategic Mutual Beneficial Relations

47

Shi Yan, Sovereignty Beyond Doubt, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 11, 2010,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-10/11/content_11392428.htm.
48
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 92-10 (1971) (“[T]he United States . . . merely received rights of
administration, not sovereignty. Thus, United States action in transferring its rights of
administration to Japan does not constitute a transfer of underlying sovereignty . . . nor can
it affect the underlying claims of any of the disputant”).
49
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo he Ribenguo Zhengfu Lianhe Shengming (中华人民共
和国和日本国政府联合声明) [Joint Declaration Between the People’s Republic of China
and Japan], available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-03/26/content_331579.htm.
50
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo he Ribenguo Heping Youhao Tiaoyue (中华人民共和国
和日本国和平友好条约) [Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the People’s Republic
of China and Japan], available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/200203/26/content_331587.htm.
51
Zhongri Guanyu Jianli Zhiliyu Heping yü Fazhan de Youhao Hezuo Huoban Guanxi de
Lianhe Xuanyan (中日关于建立致力于和平与发展的友好合作伙伴关系的联合宣言)
[Joint Declaration Between the People’s Republic of China and Japan on Establishing
Peaceful and Developing Friendly Cooperative Partnership Relations], available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-03/26/content_331597.htm.
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between People’s Republic of China and Japan concluded on 7 May 2008
(2008 Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration).52
These four treaties nullified the 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty
and formed the foundation of Sino-Japanese relations. Even though China
and Japan could have clarified the legal status of the Diaoyu Islands when
concluding these treaties, they did not make the move. The silence in
these treaties was not negligent, but rather a reflection of the PRC’s policy
towards Japan. In fact, the PRC intentionally shelved the Diaoyu Islands
dispute to allow both countries to focus on improving relations. It has
been suggested that “[i]nitially both countries tried to play down the
Islands dispute while still making clear their legal claims” and that the
Diaoyu Islands dispute “was raised by Japanese leaders in 1972 and 1978,
but in both cases the Chinese leaders, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping
respectively, proposed not to deal with it.” 53 Premier Zhou proposed
shelving the dispute for future settlement to prepare for the normalization
of the diplomatic relations with Japan, while Vice Premier Deng said that
“it does not matter if this issue [the Diaoyu Islands dispute] is put off for
some years” in order to smoothen the negotiations of the 1978 SinoJapanese Joint Declaration.54
However, the status quo approach taken by Chinese leaders did
not work as expected in practice. In fact, since the 1970s, China and
Japan have reinforced their respective claims over the Islands and
intensified the dispute by taking various administrative, legislative, and
other acts.55 For instance, in order to rebut Japan’s claim over the Diaoyu
Islands, the PRC adopted the Law of Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
on February 25, 1992, expressly prescribing the Diaoyu Islands as part of
Chinese land territory. 56 In 2010, Sino-Japanese relations suffered further
52

Zhongri Guanyu Quanmian Tuijin Zhanlue Huhui Guanxi de Lianhe Shengming (中日
关于全面推进战略互惠关系的联合声明) [Joint Declaration on Comprehensively
Promoting Strategic Mutual Beneficial Relations Between People’s Republic of China and
Japan], available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/200805/07/content_8123814.htm.
53
Reinhard Drifte, Japanese-Chinese Territorial Dispute in the East China Sea—Between
Military Confrontation and Economic Cooperation 1 (a) (Asia Research Ctr., London Sch.
of Econ. and Political Sci. Asia Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 24, 2008), available at
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/20881; see also Zhongqi Pan, Sino-Japanese Dispute over the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands: The Pending Controversy from the Chinese Perspective, 12 J.
CHINESE POL. SCI. 71, 74–77 (2007).
54
Heflin, supra note 23, at 1.
55
See Drifte, supra note 53, at 1 (c) (reviewing Chinese domestic legislation on the issue).
56
Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the People’s Republic of China,
art.2 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 25, 1992, effective
Feb. 25, 1992), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_La
w.pdf (“The land territory of the People's Republic of China includes the mainland of the
People's Republic of China and its coastal islands; Taiwan and all islands appertaining
thereto including the Diaoyu Islands, the Penghu Islands, the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha
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setbacks over diplomatic conflicts involving Japan’s detention of a
Chinese fishing trawler and its captain. In the same year U.S.
involvement in the Islands dispute, by way of an American push for
multilateral mediation, was rejected by China.57 These events appear to
strongly suggest that the Diaoyu Islands have quickly become a minefield
for both countries, and that leaving the dispute unresolved will complicate
the future of Sino-Japanese relations.
G.

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (1960)

The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was concluded on January 19,
1960. Although China is not bound by its terms because it is a
nonsignatory, the potential impact of the treaty on the Diaoyu Islands
should not be ignored. Though the Islands are not expressly mentioned in
the treaty, the terms recognized that “[e]ach Party recognizes that an
armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration
of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that
it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional provisions and processes.”58 In light of such provision, it is
generally understood that the treaty imposes an obligation on the United
States to protect Japan if the Diaoyu Islands were “attacked” by China.
Naturally, China has consistently objected to the U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty. On November 2, 2010, for instance, after the U.S. Secretary of
State announced that the Diaoyu Islands fell within the ambit of the treaty,
a Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson rebutted that “[i]t is extremely
erroneous for the U.S. to repeatedly claim that the Diaoyu Island falls
within the scope of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security. What the U.S. should do is to immediately correct its wrong
position.”59
H.

Summary of Treaty Analysis

Islands, the Zhongsha Islands and the Nansha Islands as well as all the other islands
belonging to the People's Republic of China.”).
57
See Clinton Urges Japan and China to Return to Talks over Disputed Islands, CNN (Oct.
30, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-30/world/vietnam.clinton.visit_1_senkakuislands-diaoyutai-islands-diaoyu-islands?_s=PM:WORLD (noting that U.S. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton sought to defuse tension between China and Japan by offering to
have the United States serve as a mediator in the dispute).
58
Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security, U.S.-Japan, art. V, Jan 19. 1960, 373
U.N.T.S. 179.
59
Remarks of Ma Zhaoxu, Spokesperson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's
Republic of China, Nov. 2, 2010,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2535/t766758.htm (last visited May 14, 2011).
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Several observations can be drawn from the past treaties. First,
although several treaties are dedicated to defining Japan’s post-war
territorial boundaries and purportedly deal with the legal status of the
Diaoyu Islands, none of them expressly mentioned the Islands.
Notwithstanding these agreements, it is a fact that China lost control over
the Diaoyu Islands in 1895, and the Islands were actually under either
Japanese control (1895-1951 and 1971- present) or under U.S. trusteeship
(1951-1971).
Second, the dispute dates back to the late 19th century, and has
carried on through several eras of Chinese history: the Qing Dynasty, the
Republican era, and now the PRC. Although the PRC was recognized in
1971 by the UN as the sole legal representative of China, it is undeniable
that the ROC still exists today and maintains diplomatic relations with
many countries in the world. 60 Complicating matters, the ROC arguably
shares with the PRC a sovereign claim over the Diaoyu Islands. 61
Because of the overlapping claims of both the ROC and PRC, the dispute
inevitably involves the highly sensitive cross-Strait relations. Though
cross-Strait relations are beyond the scope of this article, this unique
factor makes the dispute different from other territorial disputes.
Third, U.S. involvement in the Diaoyu Islands is another factor
complicating the dispute. Such involvement is mainly demonstrated by
the alliance stemming from the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Although this
treaty is not per se binding on China and does not expressly address the
Diaoyu Islands, the treaty’s reference to “the territories under the
administration of Japan” in Article 5 does imply that the Diaoyu Islands
are covered by the treaty. Consequently, as the treaty de facto applies to
the Diaoyu Islands, it raises a strange triangular relationship that involves
Japanese, American, and Chinese interests.

IV. THE NON-APPLICABILITY CONTENTION AND ITS FLAWS
Mainstream PRC scholars often argue that treaties made without
China’s participation, specifically the San Francisco Treaty, are not
binding on China. 62 This non-applicability contention is grounded in
60

See Bangjiaoguo (邦交國) [States that Recognize Taiwan], ZHONGHUAMINGUO
WAIJIAOBU (中華民國外交部) [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS REPUBLIC OF CHINA],
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/np.asp?ctNode=1143&mp=1 (listing twenty-three states
that maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC) (lasted visited May 14, 2011).
61
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of China (Taiwan), it has
issued 21 statements claiming sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands on various occasions
since 1971. For a list of these statements, see
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=40531&ctNode=2038&mp=1.
62
See, e.g., Kong Fanyu (孔繁宇), Cong Zhonguo Zhengfu Wuci Shengming deng
Waijiao Wenjian kan《Jiujinshan Heyue》dui Huazhi Falü Xiaoli (从中国政府五次声明
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treaty law and general principles of international law, namely the illegality
argument and the non-party argument. The illegality argument concludes
that the San Francisco Treaty is per se illegal under international law
according to the 1942 Declaration by the United Nations (UN
Declaration) and the Wartime Declarations. The non-party argument
concludes that China, as a non-party to the San Francisco Treaty, is not
bound by its terms.
A. The Illegality Argument and Its Flaws
The UN Declaration reads: “[e]ach Government pledges itself to
cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a
separate armistice or peace with the enemies.” 63 The plain language of
this provision appears to impose an obligation on the Allied Powers,
including the United States, not to conclude any peace treaty with Japan
that excludes other victorious countries, including China. The argument
follows that because the San Francisco Treaty was concluded in the
absence of China, it constitutes a “separate peace with the enemy” and is
consequently a violation of the UN Declaration.
This contention is not convincing because such an interpretation
of the UN Declaration provision is problematic. Although the UN
Declaration prohibits “separate” armistices with the Axis powers, it is
neither explicit in the number of states needed to legally conclude a peace
treaty nor requires a peace treaty be concluded with the presence of all
victorious states. Thus, there must be treaty interpretation in order to
determine the circumstances that constitute a “separate armistice or
peace.” Moreover, it is a fact that the San Francisco Treaty was accepted
and signed by forty-eight countries, including the United States and the
United Kingdom. In light of this, it is doubtful that the mere absence of
China’s assent to the agreement would render the San Francisco Treaty
illegal under international law.
Some PRC scholars also contended that the San Francisco Treaty
constitutes a violation of the Wartime Declarations. According to the
Cairo Declaration, the leading Allied Powers agreed that all territories
Japan annexed from China, such as Formosa, must be restored to the ROC.
The Potsdam Declaration reaffirmed the terms of the Cairo Declaration.
The San Francisco Treaty was a de facto codification of these Wartime
等外交文件看 《旧金山和约》对华之法律效力), 30 INNER MONGOLIA SOC. SCI. 32, 32–
33 (2009); Wang Zelin (王泽林), Riben yü Linguo Lingtu Zhuquan Zhengrui de Guojifa
Fenxi (日本与邻国领土主权争端的国际法分析), 18 NORTHEAST ASIA FORUM 12, 16
(2009); Xiao Aihua (肖爱华), Guanyu 《Jiujinshan Heyue》 de Xiaoli (关于旧金山和约
的效力), 8 J. CHONGQING U. SCI. & TECH. (SOC. SCI. EDITION) 64, 67 (2009).
63
The United Nations Declaration, HISTORY OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (Jan.
1, 1942), http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/history/images/declarationun.jpg.
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Declarations. Based on this understanding, the San Francisco Treaty cut
against the Wartime Declarations because the treaty did not clearly require
Japan to restore the Diaoyu Islands to China.
Similarly, this contention is unpersuasive. Notwithstanding their
purpose of restoring China’s sovereignty, the Wartime Declarations did
not expressly mention the Diaoyu Islands. Thus, it is hasty to conclude
that the Wartime Declarations requires Japan to revert the Islands to China.
Rather, any such claim should only be ascertained by interpreting the
Wartime Declarations. Consequently, the silence of the San Francisco
Treaty is unlikely to make the treaty either incompliant with the Wartime
Declarations or in violation of international law.
B. The Non-Party Argument and Its Flaws
An alternative argument raised by the PRC and many of its
scholars is that the San Francisco Treaty is not binding on China since it is
a non-party to the treaty.64 This argument has two parts. The first part
relies on the basic principle of treaty law of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec
prosunt, which holds that a state is not bound by a treaty to which it is not
a party and codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT). 65 This principle has also been applied frequently by
International courts and tribunals have frequently applied this principle. 66
The VCLT defines third state as “not a party to the treaty,” 67 and further
provides that “[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights . . .
without its consent.” 68 Under these provisions, China must be not be
bound by the San Francisco Treaty since it is a “third party” to it.
The second part of the argument proposes that treaty law
exceptions included in the VCLT cannot be invoked. Under the VCLT,
there are certain exceptions where a non-party state is nevertheless bound
by a treaty. For a third party to be bound by a treaty provision, two
conditions must be met: (1) the parties must intend a provision to afford a

64

See, e.g., Pan, supra note 53, at 79 (“China believes the San Francisco Peace Treaty in
question lacks any finality on the issue because neither China mainland nor Taiwan was a
signatory.”).
65
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 627 (7th ed., 2008);
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Third Parties and the Law of Treaties, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L.
37, 38 (2002) (“[P]acta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt . . . has been recognized in states’
practice as fundamental, and its existence has never been questioned.”).
66
See, e.g., The German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, PCIJ, Series A, No.7, at 28;
Chorzow Factory Case, PCIJ, Series A, No.17, at 45; Austro-German Customs Union Case,
PCIJ, Series A/B, No.41, at 48.
67
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter VCLT].
68
Id. art. 34.
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right to the state in question; and (2) the third party state must assent. 69
The San Francisco Treaty did not meet either of these conditions.
Because it did not explicitly require Japan to restore the Diaoyu Islands to
China, but rather put the Islands under U.S. trusteeship, it is doubtful
whether the treaty intended to create a sovereign right for China.
Moreover, even if that the treaty intended to give China sovereignty over
the Diaoyu Islands, the PRC’s consistent objections to the treaty indicates
that it did not assent to the treaty’s provisions.
For these two reasons, the San Francisco Treaty is not binding on
China as a non-party. Although the non-party contention appears
reasonable as a matter of law, it potentially weakens China’s claim to the
Diaoyu Islands. This is because, although the treaty did not clearly
mention the Diaoyu Islands, it did have the clear purpose of defining
Japan’s post-war territory and restoring China’s sovereignty over those
territories annexed by Japan. The treaty is thus pertinent to the dispute
because it not only serves as a codification of the Wartime Declarations
but also provides a basis for the ensuing treaties.
In light of this background, the San Francisco Treaty appears to be
favorable to China in a general sense, and denying its applicability would
potentially hurt China’s claim. Yet, notwithstanding the significance and
purpose of the San Francisco Treaty, the PRC refuses to recognize it and
attempts to ground its claim chiefly on the Wartime Declarations. The
political circumstances of the times provides a reasonable explanation for
this decision, as the PRC deemed itself the sole legal representative of
China beginning in 1949 rather than its after UN recognition in 1971;
therefore, to justify its legitimacy, the PRC does not recognize any post1949 treaties by the ROC on behalf of China.

V. TREATY INTERPRETATION AND ITS UNHELPFULNESS
The non-applicability contention should be disregarded because
the illegality and non-party arguments are both flawed. An alternative
contention may be raised instead. Given that the general object and
purpose of these treaties is favorable to China, it is advisable for the PRC
to recognize them, particularly the San Francisco Treaty, in addition to the
Wartime Declarations. As these treaties did not clearly mention the
Diaoyu Islands, an analysis of possible interpretations is needed. This
Part will examine how treaty interpretation potentially affects China’s
claim over the Islands.
69

Id. art. 35 (“An obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the
parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and
the third State expressly accepts that obligation in writing.”); see also Fitzmaurice, supra
note 65, at 47–48 (explaining the requirements of satisfying a non-party exception).
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A. Principle of Treaty Interpretation
For the purposes of this article, it is unnecessary to develop
thorough and elaborate analysis of treaty interpretation. A brief
discussion of the principles of treaty interpretation articulated in the
VCLT is sufficient. It is widely held that the relevant provisions of the
VCLT not only represent “the culminating achievement of a decade-long
effort” by International Law Commission (ILC) to establish a method for
treaty interpretation, 70 but also provide a guide to basic principles that
were already entrenched in customary international law.71
The VCLT deals with two basic aspects of treaty interpretation:
(1) the general methods of interpretation; and (2) the data to be used in
interpretation. 72 Professor Fitzmaurice classified the methods of
interpretation into three basic types: the subjective, the textual, and the
teleological.73 The subjective approach looks at the actual intent of the
parties at the time of the adoption of the final text of a treaty. The textual
approach stresses the actual words of the treaty unless they are ambiguous
or lead to obviously absurd or unreasonable conclusions. The teleological
approach looks to the treaty’s objectives and purpose to interpret a
treaty.74
To discern a treaty’s objective it may neither be necessary nor
possible to produce an exhaustive list of materials to consult because the
VCLT provides a wide range of sources that may be used for
interpretative purposes. 75 As pointed out by Professor Brownlie, the
VCLT considers various sources of data which include, inter alia, the
70

Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty
Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 437 (2004).
71
Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6, 21–22 (Feb. 3); Maritime
Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 6, 18 (Feb.
15); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. 1996 (II) 803, 812;
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1059; Sovereignty
over Pulau Litigan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 625, 632.
72
See ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 7 (2007) (discussing the use of VCLT articles and interpretation data in treaty
interpretation).
73
See G. G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice:
Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 1951 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 1
(detailing three main schools of thought in treaty interpretation).
74
See Francis G. Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special
Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic
Conference, 18 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 318, 319 (1969) (explaining modern approaches to
interpretation).
75
Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 657, 948 cmt. (1935) (commenting on Article 19 of
the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties by stating that “[a]n exhaustive list of such
materials cannot, perhaps, be made; they will vary in nature, amount and probative value
with the individual case.”).
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context, the subsequent practice of parties to the treaty, the practices of
certain organizations, particularly the International Court of Justice, and
the preparatory work of the treaty. 76
The rules of treaty interpretation are found in Articles 31–33 of
the VCLT. Article 31(1) lays out the fundamental principles of treaty
interpretation, expressly providing that a treaty term shall be interpreted in
good faith, accordance with the ordinary meaning, in context, and with
respect to its object and purpose.77 Though the principles seem to provide
four methods of treaty interpretation, international adjudication suggests
that ordinary meaning should be deemed as the starting point for treaty
interpretation. For instance, in Case of Polish Postal Service in Danzig,
the Permanent Court of International Justice held that “[i]t is a cardinal
principle of interpretation that words must be interpreted in the sense
which they would normally have in their context, unless such
interpretation would lead to something unreasonable or absurd.” 78 The
International Court of Justice also elaborated on the relationship between
ordinary meaning and the other methods of interpretation:
The Court considers it necessary to say that the first duty
of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply
the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavor to give effect to
them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context
in which they occur. If the relevant words in their natural
and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is
an end of the matter. If, on the other hand, the words in
their natural and ordinary meaning are ambiguous or lead
to an unreasonable result, then, and then only, must the
Court, by resort to other methods of interpretation, seek to
ascertain what the parties really did mean when they used
these words.79
According to the ILC, by emphasizing ordinary meaning in
Article 31(1), the VCLT opts for a textual approach. 80 In order to
decipher the ordinary meaning of a treaty term, Article 31(2) provides a
76

See BROWNLIE, supra note 65, at 631–36.
VCLT, supra note 67, arts. 31, 32; LINDERFALK, supra note 72, at 7 (believing that
Articles 31–33 inform appliers of the provisions how to correctly proceed from the
viewpoint of international law).
78
Polish Postal Service in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 11, at 39
(May 16).
79
Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 4 (Mar. 3).
80
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 9, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.l (1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l Law
Comm’n 220, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/191 (noting that by interpreting terms according to their
ordinary meaning, the Law of Treaties takes the view that “the text must be presumed to be
the authentic expression of the intention of the parties[.]”) .
77
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non-exhaustive list of materials to consult, including, inter alia, the text,
preamble, annexes, agreement, or instrument relating to the treaty. It is
important to note that each of these contexts should be considered in an
integrated manner and must not be construed as to have laid down “a legal
hierarchy of norms in the interpretation of treaties.” 81 In addition to
context, Article 31(3) also provides that subsequent agreement, practice,
or relevant rules of international law relating to the treaty or the
application of the treaty should also be taken into account in treaty
interpretation. In order to avoid a situation where the ordinary meaning
produced by the above data is “ambiguous or obscure” or “manifestly
absurd or unreasonable,” Article 32 allows the use of “supplementary
means of interpretation” to confirm the ordinary meaning by resorting to
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.
Last, but not least, due weight should also be given to the good faith
principle of treaty interpretation.
B. The Dispute and Treaty Interpretation
Several treaty provisions are relevant to the Diaoyu Islands. In
order to determine whether these provisions obligate Japan to return the
Diaoyu Islands to China or otherwise define the legal status of the Islands,
their we should explore the ordinary meaning within the VCLT
framework. Such provisions can be roughly classified into two categories
depending on whether they directly deal with the issue of territorial
disposition between China and Japan. The clauses that relate to territorial
disposition include:
(1)
“China cedes to Japan . . . all islands appertaining
or belonging to the island of Formosa.”82
(2)
“[A]ll the territories Japan has stolen from the
Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The
Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.”83
(3)
“Japan renounces all right, title and claim to
Formosa and the Pescadores.”84
(4)
Japan will concur … trusteeship system, with the
United States as the sole ministering authority, Nansei
Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu
Islands and the Daito Islands).85
The clauses that deal with treaty disposition include:
81
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Treaty of Shimonoseki, supra note 24, art. 2.
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Cairo Declaration, supra note 26.
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San Francisco Treaty, supra note 31, art. 2 (b).
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(5)
“The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be
carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to
the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and
such minor islands as we determine.”86
(6)
“[A]ll treaties, conventions and agreements
concluded before December 9, 1941, between Japan and
China have become null and void as a consequence of
war.”87

The first question explores whether the Diaoyu Islands can be
deemed as “appertaining or belonging to” Formosa and thus whether they
were ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki.88 Even though it is
undisputed that Japan took control of Formosa and of the Diaoyu Islands
after the treaty was concluded, the treaty neither expressly mentioned the
cession of the Islands nor defined the term “appertaining or belonging to.”
According to some Chinese literature, there was no practical need to
clearly address the Islands in the treaty since they were small and of little
economic value. 89 Unfortunately this explanation for the treaty’s silence
lacks legal relevance because neither land mass nor economic value of a
territory are decisive factors in determining sovereignty over a territory.
They also do not constitute legally justifiable grounds to neglect the status
of such a territory in a treaty.
In contrast to the Chinese view mentioned above, which considers
the Islands have passed implicitly from China to Japan via the Treaty of
Shimonoseki, a close examination of the context of the treaty suggests two
reasons that the term “appertaining or belonging to” does not include the
Diaoyu Islands. First, though the Pescadores Islands are approximately
thirty nautical miles from Formosa, the treaty clearly mentions them by
name and in ceding them to Japan precisely describes their geographic
location instead of using vague terms such as “appertaining or belonging
to.” 90 Thus, it is be unlikely that more distant Diaoyu Islands are
“appertaining or belonging to” Formosa, but the closer Pescadores Islands
are not.91 Moreover, the Diaoyu Islands are located around ninety nautical
miles from both the Chinese island of Formosa of China and the Ryukyu
Islands of Japan, which makes it difficult to explain why they are
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Potsdam Declaration, supra note 27, para. 8.
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San Francisco Treaty, supra note 31, art. 2 (c).
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“appertaining or belonging to” Formosa but not Ryukyu.92 Such analysis
suggests that the Diaoyu Islands should not be deemed to be “appertaining
or belonging to” Formosa, and as a corollary, that the Islands were not
ceded to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
A second question whether Japan “stole” the Diaoyu Islands from
China in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, thus requiring their return under the
Cairo Declaration, is in part a historical and in part a legal issue. To
determine whether such a “theft” took place, one has to decide whether
the Diaoyu Islands already belonged to China. The logic is simple–Japan
could not have stolen the Islands from China if China did not own them.
This question turns not on rules of cession, but on international laws of
occupation and prescription, which are beyond the scope of this article.
A third question rests on the relationship between the Potsdam
Declaration and the Cairo Declaration, inquiring whether the Cairo
Declaration required Japan to restore the Diaoyu Islands to China or
otherwise define their legal status. The answer here is contingent upon
that of the answer to the second question.
A fourth question inquires whether the Diaoyu Islands are per se a
part of Formosa. The San Francisco Treaty only expressly requires Japan
to revert Formosa to China, neither clearly mentioning the Islands nor
employing such term as “appertaining or belonging to” as the Treaty of
Shimonoseki did. Thus, to establish that the San Francisco Treaty
imposes an obligation on Japan to revert the Diaoyu Islands to China,
“Formosa” must be interpreted either as an equivalent to the Islands or as
naturally including the Islands in an ordinary reading of the word. Such
an interpretation is tenuous because: (1) neither China nor Japan has ever
referred to the Diaoyu Islands as an equivalent to Formosa, and (2) it is at
best arguable whether the Diaoyu Islands are a naturally indispensable
part of Formosa.93
A fifth question inquires whether the Diaoyu Islands are located
within the scope of “Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including
the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands)” as written in the San Francisco
Treaty. 94 The answer is affirmative, yet it must be noted that this
provision only established U.S. trusteeship over the Islands rather than
sovereignty. This understanding is corroborated by the subsequent actions
of the United States:
when the Okinawa Agreement terminated
trusteeship in 1971, the United States “reverted” the Diaoyu Islands to
Japan but clearly declared that it was only transferring the rights of
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administration. As this provision does not address the sovereignty issue,
there is no need to interpret it further.
A final question concerns whether the legal status of the Diaoyu
Islands has been addressed in any “treaties, conventions and agreements
concluded before 9 December 1941 between Japan and China.” The
Treaty of Shimonoseki is the only qualified treaty that may be relevant.
According to the nullification provision of the 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace
Treaty, if the Treaty of Shimonoseki cedes the Diaoyu Islands to Japan or
otherwise confirms Japan’s occupation, the treaty should be nullified and
Japan should restore the Islands to China; however, since it cannot be
established that the Treaty of Shimonoseki cedes the Diaoyu Islands to
Japan, it is moot to interpret this nullification provision further.
Furthermore, because the PRC nullified the 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace
Treaty, any contentions it derives from this treaty, even if favorable,
cannot be invoked.
The above interpretation of the six provisions relies on the context
of their respective treaty; however, these provisions are also closely
interrelated and should be considered in an integrated manner to form a
larger whole. 95 This is particularly necessary since some of these
provisions are not self-sufficient and their meaning is contingent on
interpretation of other treaties.96 Indeed, interpreting these provisions as a
larger whole is implicit in Article 31 (3) of the VCLT, which states that
subsequent agreements, practices, or relevant rules of international law
shall be taken into consideration for interpretative purpose. 97
Following the Article 31 (3) approach, one is likely to observe
that the above six interpretation is confirmed and enhanced. China based
its claim on the Diaoyu Islands chiefly using the Wartime Declarations,
but the Declarations did not expressly mention the Islands. The San
Francisco Treaty codified the Declarations, but rather than clarify its
vagueness it put the Islands under U.S. trusteeship. Thus, the San
Francisco Treaty, deemed by Japan as a “subsequent agreement” to the
Declarations under Article 31 (3), suggests that the terms “Formosa” and
“islands appertaining or belonging to Formosa” are not interpreted to
cover the Diaoyu Islands.
Moreover, although China did have
opportunities to rectify the vagueness of the San Francisco Treaty, none of
the ensuing treaties between China and Japan expressly touched upon the
95

See generally LINDERFALK, supra note 72, at 151 (“[T]he interpreted treaty provision
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agreements between Japan and China. As the meaning and enforcement of the provisions
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Diaoyu Islands. China’s silence in concluding these treaties, deemed by
Japan as “subsequent practice” under Article 31 (3), also suggests that the
San Francisco Treaty could not be interpreted to cover the Diaoyu Islands.
C.

The Unhelpfulness of Treaty Interpretation

Multiple treaties seek to dictate the territorial status of the Diaoyu
Islands, yet none clearly address the issue. These treaties need to be
interpreted within the VCLT framework to determine whether they
impose an obligation on Japan to revert the Islands to China. Furthermore,
because these treaties are closely interrelated, they should be interpreted in
an integrated manner. On the one hand, the Treaty of Shimonoseki cannot
be interpreted to cede the Islands to Japan; on the other hand, the
interpretation of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration, the San
Francisco Treaty, and the 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty also failed to
provide a clear determination the legal status of the Islands. Obviously,
despite the significance of these treaties in territorial disposition between
China and Japan, their legal implications in determining the sovereignty
over the Diaoyu Islands should not be overstated.
It is fair to conclude that treaty law cannot provide a satisfactory
solution to the dispute. In the legal sense, the unhelpfulness of treaty law
suggests that the international law rules of occupation and prescription,
but not the rules of cession, should govern the sovereignty of the Diaoyu
Islands. Therefore, it would also be practically unnecessary for China to
raise the claim of reversion.

VI. CONCLUSION
Due to complicated economic, political, and social reasons, the
dispute is not only a priority in Sino-Japanese relations, but also attracts
profound international concern. Considering the importance China
attaches to the cross-Strait relations and Sino-American relations, the
dispute is extremely tough and sensitive. Given the complexity,
sensitivity, and peculiarity of the dispute and China’s strong reluctance to
submit the dispute to international adjudication, 98 maintaining the status
98

After China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, however,
China’s attitude towards international adjudication has gradually changed. China’s active
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and China is still hesitant to submit public international law disputes to international
adjudication. For example, China refuses to accept ICJ compulsory jurisdiction. See
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quo of the Islands seems to be a tentatively feasible solution for the
Chinese. Yet there is a hidden danger of this solution is that this approach
will make the dispute unworkable.
Today, China faces an urgent and real need to settle the dispute
because the maintenance of the status quo by recent generations of
Chinese leaders, serving as the guiding principle for China’s strategy on
the dispute since the 1970s, has practically failed. The frequent
diplomatic conflicts between China and Japan in recent years illustrates
that the dispute is increasingly growing into a dangerous minefield for
both countries.
This article, by analyzing the relevant treaties, presents a
somehow pessimistic picture. Although the purpose of the pertinent
treaties was generally favorable to China, they failed to provide a solution
to the dispute. Such failure suggests that the international law on cession
may not be able to provide a valid legal basis for both countries to claim
sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands; however, it must be noted that
recognizing the unhelpfulness of treaty law does not mean that China has
a weaker claim over the Islands vis-à-vis Japan. As a matter of law, it
may not be wise to ground China’s claim on the international law on
cession, but other international law rules on territorial acquisition, such as
occupation and prescription, may provide legal alternatives.
The dispute is unique for the PRC because it invites cross-Straits
relations and Sino-Americans relations, which are both volatile issues.
The PRC attaches great significance to Sino-US relationship and deems
the Taiwan issue as the “most sensitive and most important issue”
between the two countries.99 For such reason, it would be politically risky
for the PRC to submit the dispute to any type of international adjudication.
Given these considerations, the PRC has little maneuvering space in
dealing with the dispute.
Nonetheless, both sides of the Straits should demonstrate more
political flexibility and jointly work on a shared claim over the Diaoyu
Islands. Understandably, such cooperation would be especially hard for
the Mainland because it may damage its image as the sole legal
representative of China in the international community and signal
Aloysius P. Llamazon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the
International Court of Justice, 18 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 815, 850 n. 240 (2008) (“Today, of
the ﬁve permanent members of the Security Council, only Great Britain has accepted
compulsory jurisdiction: France, China, the U.S., and Russia have not (nor has
Germany).”).
99
See, e.g., Su Ge, Sino-American Relations: Climbing High to See Afar, U.S.-CHINA
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION (Sept. 2001),
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/pdfs/sino.pdf; Chen Bingde (陳炳德),
Zaimei Yanjiang: Taiwan Wenti shi Zhongguo Hexin Liyi Suozai (在美演讲: 台湾问题
是中国核心利益所在), CHINA.COM (May 20, 2011),
http://news.china.com/international/1000/20110520/16551639.html.

2011] SINO-JAPAN SOVEREIGN DISPUTE OVER DIAOYU ISLANDS

189

recognition of Taiwan. That said, one should not be too hasty to dismiss
such cooperation if the “One China” framework is properly construed.
Given the PRC’s extremely cautious attitude on this issue, how and at
what pace China and Japan approach and settle the dispute remains to be
seen.

